

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

19 JAN 83



Office of Security

To: DD/P+M

SUBJECT: NSSD-2/82 (COUNTERMEASURE
ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY

Skip —

• [redacted] NAME HAS
BEEN CALLED IN TO [redacted]
[redacted] OFFICE.

• KEEP AN EYE ON THIS
EFFORT SO THAT WE CAN
LEND A HAND IF NECESSARY.

C/PPG

Per our discussion, I want to stay
[redacted]

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Terms of Reference, NSSD-2/82 Countermeasure Organizational Study

FROM:

Policy and Plans Group

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

C/Policy Branch/PPG

1/13/83

D

2.

AC/PPG

13 Jan 83

PPG

3.

DD/P&M

13 JAN 1983

1/13

L

4.

DD/Security

14 JAN 1983

1/14/83

Q

5.

D/Security

17 JAN 1983

K

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15.

The Director of Security asked for an analysis of Subject TOR. It was necessary to consult NSSD-2/82 and the "Capabilities Against the Hostile Intelligence Threat - 1983-1988" paper, both TS documents. They are not attached - to avoid creating another TS paper - and are available in PPG if needed.

Note 18 January deadline for designation of a principal representative.

[redacted] has expressed a desire to undertake this assignment and I so recommend.

I suggest [redacted] as the focal point official on this. Notes on it may be useful to discuss overall strategy with Mr. Henderson.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security

FROM:

Policy and Plans Group

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference, NSSD 2-82
Countermeasures Organizational Study

REFERENCE: IG/CM Memorandum of 11 January 83, same subj

1. The study is related to NSSD 2 tasking which called for assessment of the organizational and managerial framework to determine "the most effective application of budgetary and personnel resources" to combating/negating "espionage and other threats and activities by foreign intelligence services against the United States." The entire NSSD 2 exercise was directed toward a perception that determined and extensive activities on the part of hostile services, combined with an eroded U. S. capability to counter these activities, presented an "increasingly significant" threat to the national security.

2. The preface to "Capabilities Against the Hostile Intelligence Threat, 1983 - 1988," reflects agreement (with the NSC) that the above-mentioned tasking, along with related consideration concerning a possible central, all-source database and analysis capability, be deferred for study at a later date. The cited publication noted that these separable subjects would be afforded a good basis for later review through its (the publication's) findings. Reference does not specify that a central, all-source database will be studied; however, the concept is included in the overall NSSD 2 approach to an organizational study.

3. The study will be submitted to the SIG-I and forwarded to the President through the NSC. It is most unlikely that any organizational change in the NSC will be addressed and a poor bet that the SIG-I will be studied in terms of disestablishment or major organizational/functional change. The structure of the IG/CM and IG/CI probably will be reviewed with a view to responsibilities, membership, subcommittees and input to a discrete budget exercise dedicated to resources needed for classical counterintelligence and protective security.

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ARE CLASSIFIED SECRET**SECRET**

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4. The thrust of the study expressed in reference involves "fine tuning" (of) existing countermeasures structures and relationships." The attached "Outline for National Security Study Directive 2/82 Study" illustrates shared responsibility of agencies and, in some instances, specifies the CIA directorate concerned. The outline indicates that the study will feature comprehensive analysis of the internal organizational structure and responsibilities of the separate agencies and a compilation of the overall capability of the major topics mentioned in Section V of the TOR. The study director can establish working groups composed of knowledgeable specialists in each category of paragraphs B, C and D of Section V. The individual you will appoint as the principal representative/focal point will not necessarily participate in the selection of working groups members but should be prepared to do so. This will involve complete familiarity with the organizational makeup of the Agency and of key personnel qualified to represent the various disciplines.

5. It is suggested that the "principal representative/focal point" be selected from the senior managers of the Office and, for representational purposes, at as high a level as possible. He should be well-grounded in PTAS functions and conversant with personnel security. Also, the appointee should have that knowledge of Agency operations and activities to which the senior Office managers are privy.

25X1



Attachment

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S E C R E T

Log 5
27 April 1982

25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]
Chief, Office of Security, Policy & Plans, P&M
SUBJECT: National Security Study Directive 2/82

1. Attached for your information are an "Outline for National Security Study Directive 2/82 Study" and "Definitions for Terms of Reference and Outline for NSSD 2/82 Study".

2. Additional information on NSSD 2/82 will be forwarded to you in the future. Any questions regarding the Study may be addressed [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

Attachments:
As Stated

S E C R E T

OS REGISTRY

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Attachment A

DEFINITIONS FOR TERMS OF REFERENCE AND
OUTLINE FOR NSSD 2/82 STUDY

Threat or Intelligence Threat: The combination of capability and intent on the part of a foreign country to engage in an intelligence activity inimical to the United States.

Multidisciplinary Threat: The aggregate, irrespective of collection method or technique, of all the intelligence threats posed by a given country or country group.

Vulnerability: The potential for information to be acquired through intelligence activity. Vulnerability is independent of the threat, i.e., a vulnerability may exist even though no capability or intent exists to exploit it.

Security: Establishment and maintenance of protective measures which are intended to ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. Security requirements typically establish a required level of protection based on vulnerability rather than threat.

Communications Security: The application of security to deny unauthorized persons information which might be derived from telecommunications or to ensure the authenticity of telecommunications.

Personnel Security: The application of security to assure that persons granted access to information are loyal and trustworthy.

Physical Security: The use of guards, barriers, containers, alarms and other physical means to protect material, facilities or documents from damage, theft or unauthorized access.

Document Security: The protection of documents through the use of classification designators and their associated access controls.

Computer Security (also Automatic Data Processing Security): The protection of computers and data processing equipment and the information they contain through a combination of physical, personnel and communications security, as well as hardware, software and management controls.

Operations Security: The protection of an operation, project or program from hostile intelligence activities. Operations security establishes protective requirements based upon a comparison of vulnerabilities and the multidisciplinary threat. Operations security differs from other security programs in that it focuses on the threat.

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Counterintelligence: "...information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical, document or communications security programs." (E.O. 12333) Counterintelligence differs from security in that it is normally directed against a specific known or postulated threat.

Intelligence Countermeasures: The aggregate of all measures taken to provide protection from the intelligence activities, irrespective of method or technique, of foreign countries. Intelligence countermeasures include counterintelligence, operations security, and security. (Also called multidisciplinary counterintelligence).

Active Measures: A Soviet term for activities beyond traditional diplomacy which are used to achieve Soviet foreign policy objectives. Active measures are most frequently carried out by the intelligence services and are intended to influence the policies of foreign governments, disrupt relations between other nations, undermine confidence in foreign leaders and institutions or discredit opponents.

Interagency Group/Countermeasures

Washington, D.C. 20505

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members and Invitees
Interagency Group/Countermeasures

FROM: General Richard G. Stilwell, USA (Ret.)
Chairman

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference, NSSD-2/82 Countermeasure
Organizational Study

25X1 1. The DCI, in his capacity as Chairman, NSC/SIG-I, has directed me to
conduct a study of the organizational and structural impediments to achieving
required capabilities for detecting, analyzing and countering the non-HUMINT
foreign intelligence threat to the United States. This study is to be
submitted to the SIG-I which, after appropriate consideration, will forward it
to the NSC and the President. [redacted]

25X1 2. I have named [redacted] of the Intelligence Community Staff's
Community Counterintelligence Staff as Study Director, to be assisted by
representatives to be designated by recipient addressees. It is expected that
agency representatives will vary depending on the particular study topic being
addressed, but each agency should initially identify a principal
25X1 representative/focal point [redacted] by 18 January 1983. [redacted]

25X1 3. Draft terms of reference and study outline are attached. Your
representatives should be prepared to discuss these at an initial meeting of
the overall Study Group which will be scheduled later in January 1983. [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]

25X1 [redacted]
Richard G. Stilwell

Attachment:
a/s

OS 3 0111

25X1 [redacted]
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